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RICHARD L. BOWEN, JAMES E. T. MONCUR, and
RICHARD L. POLLOCK*

Rent Seeking, Wealth Transfers

and Water Rights:
The Hawaii Case**
ABSTRACT
The potentialfor large and questionable wealth transfers in the
creation ofprivatemarkets in water rightshas generallybeen ignored
in the literature,particularly that of the New Resource Economics.
This oversight raisesmany questions in that self-serving rent seeking
is an unavoidablepart of the political process requiredfor institutional development and reform. This paper examines the distributional implications of choosing between market-oriented and
government directed water allocation systems, a choice posed by
recent constitutional, legal, and administrativedevelopments in Hawaii. Our case study shows that large economic rents would be
recouped by a few private landowners, with little commensurate
offsetting increases in wealth or efficiency (that is, "rent creation.")
To avoid such undesired transfers, alternative means of achieving
efficiency in water allocation in Hawaii, such as auctions, deserve
consideration.

I. INTRODUCTION
The New Resource Economics (NRE) has argued that privatizing water
resources and using markets to allocate water between competing uses,
users, places, and times, will increase efficiency.' The NRE implies that
efficiency gains occur by alienating govemment-"owned" water rights to
the private sector, and thereafter relying on market incentives and discipline to ensure maximum social benefit from available water resources.
However valid this proposition may be, problems can arise from the
*Respectively, Dept. of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Univ. of Hawaii; Dept. of Economics and Water Resources Research Center, Univ. of Hawaii; and Dept. of Economics, Univ. of
Hawaii.
**This study was supported in part from funds provided by the U.S. Department of the Interior,
authorized under the Water Research and Development Act of 1978, as amended. Contents do not
necessarily reflect the view and policies of the U.S. Department of the Interior. We gratefully
acknowledge the research assistance of Linda Fernandez, the comments of Chester Lao and Williamson B.C. Chang and the administrative support of the University of Hawaii Water Resources
Research Center.
1. See Baden & Dana, Toward an Ideological Synthesis in Public Land Policy: The New Resource
Economics, in Federal Lands Policy 1 (1987); and Anderson,The New Resource Economics: Old
Ideas and New Applications, 64 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 928 (1982).
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manner in which alienation is carried out. A wide-spread concern is the
possibility of windfall gains reaped by private owners as water is transferred into higher valued uses. How large are the economic rents2 that
would be captured by private parties under a market-oriented water rights
regime? Is it appropriate that private landowners recoup such rents if they
have little or nothing to do with the corresponding creation of value
underlying the rent? Can the efficiency benefits associated with private
markets be attained without allowing large wealth transfers? These distributional issues associated with privatizing public resources have been
largely overlooked in the NRE literature.
Hawaii provides a graphic illustration of the interaction of legal, economic, and institutional factors in addressing and resolving such distributional issues. Basic institutional design choices are determining the
regime for allocating water, as well as the benefits and distribution of
benefits derived therefrom. After 30-plus years of state and federal litigation, a state constitutional amendment, and a new water code, it remains
somewhat unclear where water rights are vested and in particular who
has the right to transfer water rights and profit thereby. The NRE has
counseled4 alienating Hawaii's water use rights to private interests. The
most recent court decision,5 however, affirms the state government's
proactive role in water allocation. During this long period of legal uncertainty, population growth and economic change have made the value
of water for urban use considerably greater than in its current agricultural
use, which is primarily cane sugar cultivation. Given the value of this
water, alienation without compensation could result in the transfer of
considerable wealth, in the form of water use rights, to the landowners.
This paper develops a method for estimating the value of such wealth
transfers. To do so, we shall assume, counterfactually, that Hawaii water
rights are privately held and that a market exists for transferring such
rights. Under these assumptions, we develop a model (in section II) to
estimate the scarcity value of the water rights in the context of potential
transfers to urban uses. This value is the amount open to rent-seeking
2. "Economic rent" is a surplus of earnings above and beyond what a resource could earn in its
next best occupation; a super-normal return, as discussed in Section II below. We use the word
"rent" throughout the paper in this sense.
3. Economists generally separate equity and efficiency, a practice which tends to isolate the analyst
from meaningful participation in the public policy arena. See Bromley, Land and Water Problems:
An InstitutionalPerspective, 64 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 834 (1982); and A. Schmid, Power and Public
Choice: An Inquiry into Law and Economics (1987). Exceptions include recent articles on distributional issues associated with water ranching, see Nunn, The Political Economy of Institutional
Change: A DistributionCriterion forAcceptance of Groundwater Rules, 25 Nat. Res. J. 872 (1985),
and with interbasin transfers, see (L. MacDonnell, C. Howe, J. Corbridge, Jr., and W. Ahrens,
Guidelines for Developing Area-of-Origin Compensation (Dec. 1985) (University of Colorado Natural Resources Law Center).
4. Anderson, The MarketAlternativefor Hawaiian Water, 25 Nat. Res. J. 893 (1985).
5. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989).
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activity in the process of alienation. With institutional detail and data
presented in sections III and IV, we find (section V) that for the study
area, an area with significant urbanization prospects, potential rents are
quite significant-between $55 and $200 million in total, or roughly $700
to $2500 per housing unit to be served by the transferred water. Compensation-free transfers of such highly valuable water rights could be
avoided in several ways, including auctioning them to the highest bidder
as suggested by Williams. 6
The issue of large wealth transfers resulting from changing water institutions is not unique to Hawaii. The "sagebrush rebellion," for example, involves proposals for the transfer of control over large amounts
of federal land in the western United States to state or private control. 7
Historically, similar issues arose in the English enclosure movement and
may be involved in the current transformations in Eastern Europe. 8 A
generalization from the Hawaii case seems in order: Extant valuable
natural resources owned by the government or in common should not be
alienated compensation-free to the private sector unless the efficiency
gains resulting from private tenure and market control exceed the current
value of the resource being alienated.
H. SCARCITY VALUE, ECONOMIC RENT, AND RENT SEEKING
Stigler9 defines economic rent as the "surplus of earnings over what
can be earned in the best alternative." Assuming the best alternative is
priced in a competitive market, these "surplus earnings" represent a
supernormal return of obvious value. As applied specifically to natural
resources, scarcity rent, a form of economic rent, is simply the difference
between the price of a developed resource and extraction costs. '
Economic rent arises or persists through natural supply constraints and
resulting scarcity, as with land, rare art works, and mineral resources;
that is, inelastic supply. Scarcity value, however created, defines the upper
limit to potential scarcity rent recoupment, absent market failures; scarcity
value may exist even if it is dissipated and never explicitly recouped.
This is true even in the case where the scarcity is engineered through
government intervention such as market protection or subsidizing projects
to supply scarce water to desert farms. Using the political process for
such private wealth aggrandizement by diverting or claiming existing
6. Williams, The Law of PriorAppropriations:PossibleLessonsfor Hawaii, 25 Nat. Res. J. 911
(1985).
7. See Baden and Dana, supra note 1.
8. Allen, The Efficiency and DistributionalConsequences of Eighteenth-Century Enclosures, 92
Econ. J. 937 (1982); Wordie, The Chronology of English Enclosure, 1500-1914, 36 Econ. Hist.
Rev. 483 (1985); J. Kornai, The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System (1990).
9. G. Stigler, The Theory of Price 106 (3d ed. 1966).
10. T. Tietenburg, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (2d ed. 1988).
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value is an aspect of economic behavior that has been called "rent seeking.""
Rent seeking includes efforts undertaken to insure that the institutional
context is conducive for the recoupment of scarcity values by members
of a specific group.' 2
This paper concerns two types of rent seeking via some governmental
process:
1. Creation or validation of private ownership claims to a resource
previously in the public domain or provided below cost by government;
2. Facilitation of compensated transfers among private parties of
rights to the use of existing resources.
The first type of rent seeking is reflected in the Hawaii case by private
entities using the political process to validate their claims of ownership
to groundwater resources. The second type is manifested in related efforts
to influence the political process to permit market transfers, for monetary
consideration, of resource ownership. In a sense these two aspects are
two sides of the same coin. Without market transfers, any property right
loses much, if not all, of its value. But without clear property rights,
transferability in a market context is meaningless. Rent capture, at least
in monetized form through direct sale, is dependent upon well defined
property rights and markets.
Thus, the feasibility of capturing scarcity rents is predicated both on
the presence of significant scarcity value, and clear ownership and transferability of the resource involved. If groundwater were available in
unlimited quantities at constant cost of extraction, no scarcity value and
thus no economic rent would be generated. No one would pay a premium
for in situ water. However, once a finite limit on the availability of low
cost water arises, users will be willing to pay a premium for the low cost
water to avoid the need to resort to more expensive alternative sources. 3
This premium represents an economic rent which could be captured in
conducive institutional context.
11. We use "rent seeking" in the broad sense of activities directed at acquisition of existing
wealth without quid pro quo. A narrower use of the term connotes primarily the resource cost of
such activities, which are in addition to the deadweight loss usually associated with monopoly or
other contrived scarcities that underly the generation of rents. See G. Tullock, Rent-seeking, The
New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (1987) and J. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking,
Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (1980).
12. Several NRE writers have commented on the successful rent seeking associated with Federal
water projects in the arid west (see, e.g., Cuzdn, AppropriatorsVersus Expropriators:The Political
Economy of Water in the West, in Water Rights 13 (1983)). However, the rent seeking associated
with setting up an otherwise desirable institutional context has not received similar attention in the
NRE literature.
13. Moncur & Pollock, Scarcity Rentsfor Water: A Valuation and PricingModel, 64 Land Econ.
62 (1988).
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Scarcity value and related cost concepts for Hawaii groundwater can
be analytically defined in terms of Figure 1. In the figure, line CC
depicts marginal extraction costs for existing, conventional water sources,
such as irrigation wells. If these sources were not available, the alternative
would be a "backstop" source such as desalination, which we assume to
be available in unlimited quantity though at the high (and constant) cost
C2C 2. The third line, Ebd, shows the "efficiency price" for water, incorporating extraction costs as well as in situ value, as explained below.
Suppose that, contrary to present Hawaii law and institutional trends,
all rights to in situ water could be "owned" and sold independently of
the overlying land. Current landowners now using water for agriculture
could sell their rights to urban users as urban growth called for additional
water supply. The question would then be how much must the new urban
water user pay to gain access to the water now used in agriculture?
Because of the indeterminacy of small number bargaining situations and
related market imperfections, a point estimate of these payments is not
possible. However, this payment will be bounded at the high end by what
prospective buyers are willing to pay, and at the low end by what sellers
are willing to accept.

Fig. 1. Cost, Value and Rent

Capacity (mgd)
ac = willingness to pay at marginal capacity q*
ab = willingness to accept (= potential scarcity rent) at q"
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In Figure 1, consider a potential buyer such as the urban water supply
agency contemplating a capacity addition to the level q*. Under the
conditions just outlined, the buyer can either purchase water rights covering an existing source, with extraction costs q*a, or develop the backstop at cost q*c. Thus for the incremental source at capacity q*, the
buyer's maximum willingness to pay for existing rights is represented by
the distance ac. Given that owners of the relatively low cost wells may
refuse to sell, or will sell only at prices exceeding the urban users'
willingness to pay, the cost of water from the backstop technology or
more costly wells would be immediately relevant at the time of each
negotiation.
The owner's willingness to accept compensation in exchange for rights
to a well is also affected by the scarcity situation. If today's rate of use
increases by one unit, the buyer will incur sooner the higher costs of
supra-marginal wells. The resulting increase in the present value of future
costs is scarcity value attached to the marginal well. Adding extraction
cost to scarcity value yields the efficiency price" of extracted water
referred to above (line Ebd). At q*, owners of the marginal source are
fully aware that any prospective buyer will have to pay more, and sooner,
for even the next-least-costly well if they (said owners) refuse to sell.
This awareness is the basis for determining the owner's reservation price.
At (marginal) capacity q*, potential scarcity rent is the distance ab and
represents the seller's minimum willingness to accept. Under perfectly
competitive market conditions, a seller could not extract rents exceeding
ab. However, with only a limited number of landowners, additional monopoly rent of as much as bc may be extracted. Thus the upper bound
of rent recoupment is ac.
Section V presents empirical estimates of willingness to accept and
willingness to pay, which determine upper and lower limits of a likely
market price. The price in actual transactions will be determined by
relative bargaining power and the extent of competition. 5
The costs involved in seeking rent have been a primary concern of the
recent literature. 6 Lobbying, public relations activities, legal challenges
14. See Hanson, IncreasingExtraction Costs and Resource Prices:Some FurtherResults, 7 Bell
J. Econ. 337 (1980). Under appropriate market conditions, the efficiency price also would be the
market price of extracted water.
15. An alternative approach to defining and measuring willingness to accept uses the opportunity
cost of the water. Opportunity cost is determined by the value of marginal product of that water in
its next most valuable use, which in this case is sugar production. However, scarcity value of the
water for urban uses will exceed the opportunity cost of the water in agricultural use by a considerable
margin (see R. Shrestha, An Econometric Analysis of the Choice of Adoption and Diffusion of
Irrigation Technologies in Hawaii's Sugar Industry (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Hawaii).
16. Flowers, Rent Seeking and Rent Dissipation:A CriticalView, 7 Cato J. 431 (1987).
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or campaign contributions exemplify such costs. These economic rentseeking costs only add to existing problems which result from the presence
of economic rents per se. Because of the low elasticity of demand characteristic of urban water use, the conventional deadweight loss generated
by restriction of water use is minor. However, potential scarcity rents
remain as does the derivative policy issue of how these rents should be
distributed among members of society. In this context, costs of rent
seeking per se may not be important. Any resource cost involved in
capturing those rents will never be likely to exceed the total potential
scarcity rents available to be captured. Thus our measure of potential
rents subsumes any such added transactions costs.
III. THE HAWAII WATER RIGHTS REGIME
The water use rights regime in Hawaii is presently unsettled. The
situation traces at least to 1958, when a sugar plantation on the island of
Kauai filed a suit involving competing claims to surface water. Fifteen
years later, in McBryde v. Robinson, 7 the State Supreme Court held that
neither private party "owned" the water at issue. The court found that
the state, rather than any private party, "owns" the water. The sugar
companies then sued the state, alleging an unconstitutional taking of
property without compensation. After several appeals and rehearings the
legal issues are still not resolved. The most recent ruling s favored the
state, but further action remains possible.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, several state and county planning
studies projected full development of all potable water sources in some
parts of the state by the turn of the century.' 9 These projections heightened
public concern and led to a search for alternative water sources and
conservation measures.
In the midst of this judicial and planning activity, the 1978 state constitutional convention proposed an amendment mandating the legislature
17. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330, affid on rehearing, 55 Haw.
260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973).
18. This ruling came in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989), which landowners
originally filed in response to the unexpected and dramatic Hawaii Supreme Court decision in
McBryde 54 Haw. at 174, 504 P.2d 1330. The 9th Circuit Court noted that ". . . it seems clear that
the issues commented upon by the Hawaii Supreme Court substantially clouded the title of the
appellees and could affect financing and transfers of property interests.... However, we cannot
say at this point that appellees 'retained [no] reasonable beneficial use' or that their 'expectation
interests had been [completely] destroyed.' . . . We therefore now conclude that even if the State
of Hawaii has placed a cloud on the title of the various private owners, this inchoate and speculative
cloud is insufficient to make this controversy ripe for review. Further, we reject appellees' argument
that their claim is analogous to a physical takings claim." 887 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1989) vacating
676 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Haw. 1987).
19. City and County of Honolulu Board of Water Supply, Oahu Water Plan (July 1982).
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to designate a state agency responsible for the conservation and allocation
of water. Voters approved the amendment2 ° on November 7, 1978. A
series of commissions, study groups, and legislative hearings between
1978 and 1987 searched for the proper legislative response to the constitutional mandate. 2' Fundamental legal issues about the validity of both
land and water ownership claims were raised by legal scholars.22 The
Groundwater Management Act of 1970 had given the state government
considerable allocative power over groundwater supplies in designated
areas of scarcity. Legislation implementing the constitutional amendment
(the State Water Code23) was passed by the Hawaii legislature in April
1987. The amendment and subsequent code were predicated on the belief
that existing institutions were inadequate for coping with the conflicts
and planning choices likely to arise out of growing demand in the face
of apparent limits on new water sources.
Even if no further appeal is filed in the saga initiated by the McBryde
decision, the unconstitutional takings question of Robinson may generate
further litigation. The State Commission on Water Resources Management, established by the Water Code and appointed in 1987, has not
taken any substantive action that would clarify the Code's rather vague
prescriptions. Eventually the commission will take some action, such as
denying a permit or transfer, and thus provoke a suit on grounds of
unconstitutional taking of property.
20. The amendment, now Haw. Const., art. xi, § 7, says that:
The State has an obligation to protect, control and regulate the use of Hawaii's
water resources for the benefit of its people.
The legislature shall provide for a water resources agency which, as provided by
law, shall set overall water conservation, quality and use policies; define beneficial
and reasonable uses, protect ground and surface water resources, watersheds and natural
stream environments; establish criteria for water use priorities while assuring appurtenant rights and existing correlative and riparian uses and establish procedures for
regulating all uses of Hawaii's water resources.
21. See Advisory Study Commission on Water Resources to the Thirteenth Legislature, State of
Hawaii, Report (January 1985); Hawaii's Water Resources: Directions for the Future: A Report to
the Governor (1979).
22. J. Van Dyke, et al., Selected Legal Issues Related to Growth Management in Hawaii, Growth
Management Issues in Hawaii: Problems, Perspectives, Policy Implications (1977) (for the Hawaii
Institute for Management and Analysis in Government); W.B.C. Chang, Water Code Development
in Hawaii: History and Analysis, 1978-1987 (University of Hawaii Water Resources Research Center
Technical Report No. 173, February 1987).
23. State Water Code, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 174C (Supp. 1989). The code establishes an agency
(the Division of Water Resources) governed by a five-member State Water Commission. The Commission is given criteria by which a hydrologic area shall be declared a "designated water management
area." Within such areas, all water withdrawals shall be by permit only. Permits have unlimited
duration, as long as the existing use, location and times of use continue in a beneficial manner.
Existing users are "grandfathered" into permits, but may freely transfer the permits only if the
specified use, location and time remain unaltered. Conditions under which transfers between uses,
locations or time patterns will be permitted remain unspecified in the code and will be determined
as the Commission accumulates a history of actions.
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In the face of this uncertainty, a range of institutional alternatives exist,
depending on various combinations of permit length and ease of transferability. A market-oriented system, on the one hand, would require
permits of essentially perpetual length and ready transferability between
parties, regardless of changes in time, place, or use of the water. This
approach is consistent with the NRE, and maximizes the possibility of
rent capture by landowners. On the other hand, a government-directed
mechanism would specify restrictive permitting and transfer features.
Lacking transferability, current permittees could not sell their water rights
and thus could not capture the associated rents. Instead, the rents would
be dissipated, for example in the form of low water rates to urban users.
A continuum of possibilities lies between these two extremes. Indications are that the Water Resources Management Commission is fabricating a hybrid system, based on the Water Code, a hybrid system that
tends toward the government-directed end of the spectrum, thus dampening the possibilities for rent recoupment.24 The Water Code itself specifies perpetual permits, but sharply limits their transferability. The permits
effectively expire with the eventual withdrawal of land from sugar production. It should be noted, however, that the commission has considerable latitude on many points of its mandate, and its decisions remain
open to judicial interpretation. Until the commission builds a record of
decisions, and the courts interpret them, one can only conjecture as to
the sort of water tenure or transfer regime Hawaii has.
Without prejudging the eventual resolution of this institutional evolution, we posit, counterfactually, a relatively straightforward market
context consistent with prescriptions of the New Resource Economics:
well defined, fully privatized and transferable water use rights, with
government oversight only to the extent necessary to prevent third party
effects. For purposes of this valuation exercise, we assume a "loose
permitting" regime. The water commission would issue perpetual water
use permits to landowners, thus effectively assigning ownership of water
use rights to present owners of the overlying land. These assumptions
establish the preconditions for recoupment of any rent by existing landowners.
Finally, note that regardless of who gets the rents in what form, the
potential scarcity value still exists. It is up to the political process to
24. One such indication is the administrative superstructure involving staff and numerous regulatory procedures set up by the new Water Commission. Extensive operations have begun to register
all extant claims to water rights, and numerous hearings have been held to establish new Water
Management Areas in which the Commission has significant powers to allocate water. The codemandated state and county water plans likewise suggest that the Commission will assume a very
proactive role. Most telling is the Commission's unilateral decision to reallocate some unused water
use rights from a sugar plantation to the Board of Water Supply, the primary urban water vendor,
and military users.
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define the institutional regime which will determine the locus and form
of distribution of that scarcity value. Good policy and institutional design
require that this choice be made explicitly with both efficiency and equity
(distributional) goals and constraints in mind.
IV. PROSPECTIVE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF URBAN WATER
The island of Oahu, with about three fourths of Hawaii's population,
has nearly reached its capacity for groundwater and surface water development.'s Nonetheless, the urban growth experienced on Oahu in the
past several decades will likely continue. Water sources currently used
for irrigation are candidates for transfer to the urban sector, but are limited
in quantity. Eventually, additions to urban water supply will require desalination of brackish groundwater and, ultimately, seawater. A pilot
desalination plant is currently under construction.
The water economy of Oahu consists of two sectors, agriculture and
urban, as shown in Figure 2. The urban sector consists of municipal users,
serviced by the Honolulu Board of Water Supply (BWS), military users,
and owners of private water systems. Irrigation constitutes the largest use
of water on the island, accounting in 1988 for 47 percent of all water
use.26 Two sugar plantations account for about 90 percent of agricultural
water, a portion that will decrease as land is withdrawn for urban development. Only a modest expansion in other agricultural uses is likely.
Groundwater sources provide over 99 percent of the water used on Oahu.
There are several scenarios for urban expansion on Oahu, all of which
foresee growth primarily in the Ewa, Pearl Harbor, and Honolulu districts
(see Figure 3). The Honolulu district will grow through infilling and
continued shifting to higher density housing. Ewa district, to the west of
Pearl Harbor, is the site of a planned "second city" where large state,
city, and private housing projects have recently broken ground or are
planned. Other large landowners are pushing for development of their
lands in central Oahu to the north of Pearl Harbor.
Population and water use projections summarized in Table 1 indicate
that a projected 134 million gallons per day (mgd) of new urban water
capacity will be needed over the next 40 years for the entire island of
Oahu. About 83 percent, or 112 mgd, of this new demand will go to the
25. The Pearl Harbor aquifer, the island's primary source of groundwater, has reached sustainable
yield and has been closed to further groundwater development. Indeed, a recent study (G. Yuen, J.
Mink & J. Chang, Review and Re-evaluation of Groundwater Conditions in the Pearl Harbor
Groundwater Control Area, (State of Hawaii Department of Water and Land Development Report
R-78, 1988)) determined that the sustainable yield of the aquifer had been previously overstated.
As a result, allocations to both Oahu Sugar Company and the BWS will be reduced over a five-year
period, although this generally represents water allocations that are not currently utilized.
26. Data cited in this paragraph (and in Figure 2) are from City and County of Honolulu, Oahu
Water Management Plan (March 1990).
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Fig. 2. Oahu Water Use, 1988
Million Gallons Daily (mgd)
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Table 1. Population and water demand projections
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14
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14
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(gallons)
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20202024

19951999
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20002004
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19901994
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Note: Population growth beyond 2010 and per capita daily consumption beyond 2005 estimated by extrapolation.
mgd = million gallons daily.
Sources: Department of General Planning, Residential Development Implications of the Development Plans, City and
County of Honolulu. 1985 (population); Board of Water Supply. Municipal Water Use Plan, 1981 (Per capita consumption.)

three districts mentioned above.27 Varying amounts, between nine and 18
mgd of the new capacity will be needed every five years to meet urban
growth projections for the study area. These increases can be visualized
as movements outward along the horizontal axis of Figure 1 and amount
to assuming that demand is perfectly price inelastic.
A recent development not fully accounted for in the water demand
estimates is the large number of proposals for new golf courses on Oahu.
In early 1989 there were 32 courses under construction or being planned.
The upsurge was so great that the city council placed a 15-month moratorium on golf course approvals in order to study cumulative impacts.
Should this land use alternative prevail, then our estimates of future water
demand are conservative.
Transfers and desalination are two major alternatives for meeting future
urban water needs. Oahu Sugar Co., the principal current water user in
the study area, gets about 20 mgd from the Waiahole Ditch, an elaborate
system of tunnels and ditches developed in the nineteenth century to
27. These data come from island-wide population projections (State of Hawaii, Dept. of Planning
and Economic Development), with regional distributions from City and County of Honolulu, Department of General Planning, Residential Development Implications of the Development Plans
(1985), and per capita water use estimates from the Board of Water Supply.
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transfer water from mountain dikes and Windward Oahu valleys to sugarcane fields in the island's central plain. The company's remaining 91
mgd (as of 1985) comes from wells. Campbell Estate plans to develop
brackish caprock water in a dual system for irrigating large open spaces
(for example, parks, golf courses) in the planned second city. However,
brackish groundwater is extremely limited and desalination of seawater
eventually will be necessary.
Continued sugarcane production on Oahu is uncertain for reasons largely
unrelated to water. Sugarcane will almost surely go out of production if
federal price supports and associated sugar import quotas are abolished
or reduced significantly. Urbanization also threatens the existence of Oahu
Sugar Co., whose cultivated lands are all leased. Existing long-term leases
expire in 1995 and 1996, although sugar production may continue thereafter under short-term arrangements. While continued marginal reductions in sugarcane production are still possible, at some point Oahu Sugar
will no longer have enough land to maintain economies of scale necessary
for profitable production.
Importing water from other areas of the island is not likely. The windward side of the island is estimated to have 37 mgd of remaining groundwater capacity, only slightly more than required to meet urban growth
and maintain interconnected surface flows in that region and in the eastern
end of Oahu over the next 40 years. The more remote North Shore area
of Oahu is not connected to the main county system, and water exports
from that region, which would require high lifting or tunneling costs,
appear uneconomical at this time.28
Landownership in Central Oahu is highly concentrated. Five private
entities own all of the land slated for future urban development in that
area: the Campbell, Robinson, and Bishop estates, Amfac Corp., and
Castle and Cooke, Inc. Campbell Estate owns all of the land planned for
urban development in Ewa district. Groundwater underlying its lands is
best positioned to supply the water needs of the planned second city. The
next largest player is Oahu Sugar, a subsidiary of Amfac. Although its
property holdings in central Oahu are relatively small, Amfac owns the
Waiahole Ditch system mentioned above. All five landowning trusts have
major housing development plans and compete aggressively for approvals
to implement their plans.
Since major developers are expected to provide the water for their
projects, a variety of urban water rights buyers will be involved; the BWS
will not operate as a monopsonist. On the sellers' side, the small number
of landowners (and, presumably, water owners) suggests the possibility
for collusion. A strong bargaining position would allow prospective own28. City and County of Honolulu, Oahu Water Management Plan 84, Table 7 (1990).
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ers to negotiate high prices for water rights and.to capture monopoly rents
in addition to scarcity rents.
V. WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND TO ACCEPT
With the institutional framework specified and with water demand and
supply data, we are ready now to describe data for the functions and
relationships of Figure 1 and then to estimate willingness to pay and to
accept. Consider first the marginal extraction cost function, labelled CC,
in the figure. Table 2 presents cost data covering existing water sources
that might supply the study area. All wells (strictly speaking, well fields)
shown here are currently used for sugarcane irrigation, and are arrayed
according to estimated annual cost (for drilling, headworks, transmission,
operation, and maintenance) per million gallons daily (mgd) of capacity.
Presumably, BWS would want to acquire new sources in this order.
Denote the extraction costs of the f" water source as Cj, and its yield as
qj. where j = 1 refers to the least expensive source. Taken together, the
Clj. as shown in the last column of Table 2, values trace out a stepwise
version of the CC curve in Figure 1.
Table 2. Costs of water from candidate sources

Name of
Source j
4

Wai

Depth
(feet)

Yield
(mgd)

Distance
(miles)

Well
cost1
($/yr)

Transmission
Cost 2
($/yr)

Operation
Cost 3
($/yr)

Total
Cost
($/yr)

Annual
Cost/mgd

(cti)

($/yr)

NA 20.82

4.8

489833.

116861.

0.

606694.

29140.

OS5

220.

5.66

1.3

8477.

29897.

227249.

265623.

46930.

OS3

226.

4.71

1.0

8890.

22998.

194264.

226152.

48015.

EP10

200.

5.23

3.0

7908.

68994.

190895.

267797.

51214.
69005.

OS2

340.

5.09

1.0

12404.

22998.

315835.

351236.

OS7

385.

9.82

1.5

12595.

34497.

689978.

737070.

75058.

EP15

400.

4.96

1.0

14271.

22998.

362080.

399349.

80514.

EP16

415.

7.64

1.0

13881.

22998.

578635.

615514.

80565.

EP7

475.

6.02

1.0

16063.

22998.

521859.

560919.

93176.

OS8

480.

6.02

1.0

16205.

22998.

527352.

566555.

94112.

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

821250.

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

821250.

EP23
EP27

5
5

Note: OS = Oahu Sugar Co.; EP = Ewa Plantation; Wa = Walahole Ditch.
tDrilling and headworks cost estimated from Board of Water Supply and Department of Land and Natural Resources data
on2 well development. Total costs annualized at three percent interest assuming 50 year life of installation.
Average cost per mile for six main projects (BWS Annual CIP Budgets) multiplied by distance in column 4 above and
at three percent for 40 years.
annualized
3
$0.50 per million foot-gallons x depth of well x yield x 365 = (S/year)
4
Waiahole Ditch is about 80% confined dike and 20% surface water brought through tunnels from Windward Oahu. Costs
estimated from data supplied by BWS. Since this water would flow downhill, operation costs are assumed zero.
5EP23 and EP27 produce somewhat brackish caproclk water. Cost figure covers desalination as well as transmission and
operation.
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As urban capacity rises over time, so will extraction cost. The BWS
eventually will find costs of the marginal conventional water source higher
than for alternatives. Indeed, a demonstration plant has recently been
built to experiment on a relatively large scale with various methods of
desalinizing brackish caprock water. Once all transfers of potable groundwater and these brackish sources have been fully exploited,2 9 however,
the ultimate backstop-desalinated seawater-must come into play. No
thorough cost estimates appear to have been done specifically for Hawaii
area seawater, but higher salinity would make desalination of seawater
more expensive than for brackish groundwater. Published costs for plants
elsewhere in the world suggest a range of $1.825 million to $3.650
million, per mgd,3 ° assuming year round, full capacity operation. These
figures will serve to bracket the backstop cost C2C2.
The water sources listed in Table 2 will supply some 96.7 mgd, thus
satisfying projected demand growth into year 35 of the 40-year planning
horizon covered by Table 1. These sources represent essentially all existing capacity in the study area.3 Water imports involve prohibitive
pumping lifts, transmission costs or both. Hence 96.7 mgd serves as an
estimate of the switch point, qT. in Figure 1, beyond which the backstop
source must be brought into production.
With marginal extraction costs, the backstop cost, and switch time,
we can proceed to estimate (maximum) willingness to pay and (minimum)
willingness to accept. At the margin q* in Figure 1, the BWS would be
willing to pay as much as q*c less extraction cost q*a to obtain a conventional water source, rather than being forced immediately to begin
desalination. This implies potential rents of ac for that source. In general,
this difference can be denoted C2 - C 1 dollars per unit, for each of the
qj units produced by the jf incremental source.
Discounting to time zero at rate r, then, the present value of willingness
to pay from the jf source is
(C2 -Cj)q
(I+ r)"

where t*is the midpoint of the five-year period (from Table 1) over which
29. It has been estimated that brackish water desalination costs will range from $1.25 to $2.25
per thousand gallons (Park Engineering, Brackish Water Study (1983) performed for City and County
of Honolulu Board of Water Supply)). Assuming year-round operation of the desalination facility,
these numbers translate to $456,250 (= $1.25/1000 gallons x 365 days/year X 1000) and $821,250
per million gallons daily. A more recent study (D.M. Marske, Proposed Demonstration Desalting
Plant, 7-27, Division of Water and Land Development, Department of Land and Natural Resources,
State of Hawaii, Report R-74, (1985)) suggests that the latter figure is the more realistic. These
values are used in place of the conventional costs given for EP23 and EP27 in Table 2.
30. H. Pohland, Reverse Osmosis, Handbook of Water Purification 363 (3d ed. 1985); Ukayli
& Husain, ComparativeEvaluationof Surface WaterAvailability, WastewaterReuse and Desalination
in SaudiArabia, 13 Water Int'l 218 (1988).
31. This figure assumes that the BWS will maintain a policy of limiting withdrawals to sustainable
yield, at least over the long run, for all sources.
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q, is brought into use. Calculating this for each source and summing over
successive new sources, j yields the present value of all such potential
rents, presented in Table 3. At the lower estimate of the backstop, $1.825
million, this indicates that transferrable water rights would generate total
willingness to pay of $98.6 million as shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Willingness to accept and to
pay for water in the study area

Backstop Cost Cn
($/mgd)

Willingness
to Pay
($million)

I

Willingness
to Accept
($million)

1,825,000

98.6

56.6

3,650,000

203.6

115.7

Note: mgd = million gallons perday. Valuesdiscounted to
1990 at r = 3%. Assumesbrackishwaterin wells EP23and
EP27 desalinated at $821.250/mgd.

To estimate the corresponding willingness to accept, note that landowners, as profit seekers, have an incentive to inform themselves of the
opportunity cost of water used in their operations, by considering its value
in alternative uses, including the scarcity value of water sources. This
opportunity cost depends on the value of water in urban use and the
scarcity of low cost sources appropriate for such use. Given this information, owners form a perception of scarcity value which in turn defines
willingness to accept compensation for the water rights.
This perception can be viewed in the following manner. BWS planners
foresee a time T when a high cost backstop source of water must be
brought into play.32 If this "switch time" could be delayed, the Board
could thereby realize a decrease in (the present value of) future costs of
supplying a given demand path over time. This present value constitutes
potential scarcity rent on the existing marginal water source, corresponding to distance ab in Figure 1. As noted in section II, this difference
between efficiency price and extraction cost represents willingness to
accept by current owners for the marginal source. Aggregating over sources,
as before, yields total willingness to accept. 3 Based on the same data as
for the $98.6 million willingness to pay estimate in Table 3, willingness
32. Given our assumption of a prespecified, perfectly price inelastic path of demand increases
over time, the switch time T corresponds on a one-to-one basis with a demand level qr. Hence the
horizontal axis in Figure 1 represents both quantity and time. A more sophisticated optimal control
framework would account for feedback effects of price on quantity growth.
33. Competitive market operation usually provides data to determine scarcity value 0 as the
residual of market price p over extraction cost C. In the present case, we lack price data and must
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to accept is $56.6 million. Bargaining between buyer and seller will
establish a transaction price somewhere between these two figures.
The results of this simulation are most sensitive to the backstop cost
C2. If the backstop cost is set at the upper limit of estimates noted above,
$3.65 million/mgd, then the willingness to pay estimate rises to $203.6
million (Table 3) and willingness to accept is now $115.7 million.
In sum, while we lack all the data for a definitive point estimate, the
data in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that willingness to pay by the BWS would
range between $98.6 and $203.6 million. While corresponding estimates
of willingness to accept, at $56.6 and $115.7 million, overlap the willingness to pay range, there is clearly scope for substantial wealth transfers.
For perspective, this range implies a premium on housing costs of $700
to $2500 per housing unit projected for the study area.
VI. CONCLUSION: INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATIONS
Given the present ambiguity about ownership and transfer of rights to
groundwater in Hawaii, it is no surprise that prospective recipients of
economic rent are using the political process to shape the state's institutions for water allocation; that is, engage in rent seeking. These groups
include the landowners who want privatized water rights along with market allocation so that the rents can be recouped when sugar production
ceases. Others, such as the present water purveyors, urban developers,
and other urban users, prefer the present system where economic rents
are dissipated in low urban water prices. A variety of public interest
groups object to the perceived "windfall" gains or wealth that might
accrue to sugar companies or landowners whose ownership claims to both
land and water are thought to be tainted by the methods used to acquire
these resources. Proponents of strong state planning, a very common
synthesize it in a model paralleling that of Moncur and Pollock, supra note 13, at 62. Let p, denote
the efficiency price path (of the extracted resource) comparable to line Ebd in Figure 1:
p, = C 2e"

r

'' +

re-('CIAdr

(1)

(see Hanson, supra note 14, at 336). Our extraction cost function C,(,, corresponding to line C,Ca,
takes the stepwise form. Suppose for illustration that Cuc, has only two steps:
= JC1,

0 --t<tJ

(2)

Segmenting the integral above to accommodate the discontinuities in C, and then integrating yields
the efficiency price path for our specific case. Finally, subtracting C,,,, yields the path of scarcity
value (willingness to accept) over time. For t e (0,t,
,
= p, - CJ(
= (C2_C,)e+ (C,2_C,,)er
(3)
For F (tT), 0, includes only the first term in this last expression.
Proceeding in this fashion, we obtain o. for each subperiod in (0,T). Multiplying 0, by the
appropriate capacity q,.,. discounting back to time t = 0 and adding over sources j yields the estimates
given in Table 3. To be commensurate with the extraction cost data, time 0 may be interpreted as
1990.
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predisposition in Hawaii, do not trust the market to determine the rate
and extent of transfer of agricultural land and water to urban uses. Members of all groups have lobbied extensively, drafted legislation, sponsored
research and public meetings, and participated in or supported lawsuits.
The objective policy analyst may have trouble picking sides. On the
one hand economists generally appreciate the efficiency enhancing features of markets once they are in place, assuming the absence of market
failures. However, in this case there is doubt about the magnitude of
marginal social gains to be achieved through landowners' likely responses
to new price incentives, in light of incentives which already exist. Moreover, as we have emphasized in this paper, analysts must be sensitive to
questionable distributional effects or wealth transfers that would result if
water markets were set up in such a way as to permit concentrated rent
recoupment without rent creation.
The standard prescription of the new resource economics calls for
privatizing the resource and allowing the market to determine its allocation
in pursuit of maximum rent creation. However, in the Oahu case, significant increases in overall efficiency or wealth will not likely occur,
thus rent creation potential is small. Water will be used more efficiently
when it is transferred from lower valued agricultural uses to higher valued
urban uses. But this shift will happen on Oahu regardless of the extent
of privatization and marketing of water, given the desire of landowners
to shift land to urban use to exploit intense demand for housing. Sugar
production on Oahu, accounting for the bulk of agricultural land and
water consumption, is basically an inefficient use of resources resulting
from quota protection and subsidies. As sugar fades away, a window of
opportunity may open for alternative crops in Central Oahu, but the time
frame is too short for any other major agricultural activity to establish
itself before being displaced by inevitable urbanization. Elsewhere in
Hawaii, much of the land retired from sugar production and not shifted
to urban uses remains idle.
Moreover, the rate of urban growth on Oahu is probably independent
of either the presence of sugar production or the irrigation practices of
the remaining sugar plantations. The present landowners, the likely recipients of scarcity values estimated in this paper, cannot augment the
values created by urbanization and thus cannot affect the amount of rents
being sought. Population growth, zoning practices, and water allocation
institutions will be the primary determinants of the size of the scarcity
value and resulting economic rents from urbanization, not the landowners.
Even before leases expire on land cultivated in sugar cane, the landowners
press for urban zoning.
This scenario of potential rent seeking and recoupment without rent
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creation results from a particular set of circumstances. However limited,
the Hawaii case still serves as an important qualification to the applicability of one of the more central and general institutional prescriptions
of the NRE. Privatization, without recognition of and compensation for
existing scarcity value, and subsequent market allocation of groundwater
on Oahu would be achieved only at the cost of rather signficant and
questionable wealth transfers.
On the other hand, potential efficiency gains in water use probably
cannot be achieved under a permanent government planning and regulation process. For one thing, water is likely to remain undercosted and
underpriced. Since state law and judicial decisions have placed the water
rights in state hands, one possibility for realizing efficiency gains without
the wealth transfers is to have the state auction the water rights to the
highest bidder, as suggested by Williams.' Bid prices paid by new rights
holders or their customers would then fully reflect the scarcity value of
the water resource, thus enhancing efficiency. Economic rents would
accrue to the government, rather than private owners. Once auctioned,
water rights would remain in the private sector, leaving future allocation
decisions subject to market efficency criteria.
The auction solution faces several problems of a "public choice" nature. Given interest group pressures and bureaucratic incentive structures,
is the public sector capable of organizing and conducting auctions with
efficient and equitable outcomes? If an efficient auction procedure were
devised, would the concentration of landownership simply foil it? Would
all government entities, including local water utilities, be expected to
take part in the auction and pay full value?
In principle, government could retain the water rights and still achieve
efficiency by pricing at full economic cost and by rationalizing land use
planning. But true marginal cost pricing has seldom been achieved by
public utilities, and land use planning processes invite their own rent
seeking behaviors.
Nevertheless, under a "loose permitting" system facilitating privatization without compensation to the public sector, and subsequent market
exchanges, Oahu urban water users as a group would be paying landowners a $55 to $200 million bonus to support the landowners' prior
decison to exit from an inefficient agricultural activity, with little or no
prospect of offsetting social gains. In short, when institutions have to be
designed in a second-best world, prescriptions of the New Resource
Economics require qualification.

34. Williams, supra note 6, at 914.
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NOTATION & ABBREVIATIONS
Backstop cost
Cost of the jh source of transferred water, that is, of the j irrigation
well
Discount rate
r:
Yield of the j' source (in mgd)
qj:
mgd: million gallons per day
efficiency price of extracted water
p:
Scarcity rent or value: 0 = p - C,
0:
BWS: Honolulu Board of Water Supply, the urban water supply utility
for the island of Oahu
C 2:
C~j:

